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 Impression Management and Non-GAAP Disclosure  
in Earnings Announcements 
Abstract  
We study the market reaction to the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings measures in 
earnings announcement press releases that are combined with high impression 
management. We hand-collect and code quantitative and qualitative information 
from earnings announcement press releases of large European firms. We construct 
an impression management score that includes several communication techniques 
that managers often use to positively bias investors’ perceptions of firm 
performance. We document that non-GAAP adjustments are more persistent when 
accompanied by higher levels of impression management. This evidence is 
consistent with managers trying to distort users’ perceptions when non-GAAP 
adjustments are of lower quality. Market reaction tests suggest that investors are 
able to see through managers’ intentions and ignore non-GAAP information that is 
accompanied by high impression management. Moreover, the negative market 
reaction is stronger in countries with more sophisticated financial statement users 
and stronger protection of minority shareholders rights. Our results are robust to a 
battery of sensitivity tests, including using a machine-coded tone measure. 
Keywords: pro forma; alterative performance measures; disclosure tone; capital 
markets. 
JEL classification: M41 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We study the market’s reaction to the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings 
measures that are accompanied by impression management communication 
techniques, and explore how this reaction varies across countries. In a corporate 
reporting context, impression management is a process in which managers select and 
present information  in a way that distorts alter users’ perceptions of corporate 
achievements (Neu et al., 1998).  
We find evidence consistent with managers using high levels of impression 
management to mask the recurring nature of some non-GAAP adjustments. We also 
find that investors perceive this combination to be strategic and penalize firms for 
this behavior. Thus, while there is a mean positive market reaction to non-GAAP 
adjustments, the adjustments that are accompanied by high impression management 
are ignored. The country-level results suggest that this reaction is more pronounced 
in environments with more sophisticated financial statement users (stronger 
presence of institutional investors and financial analysts), and stronger investor 
protection. 
Since markets value persistent earnings (Collins and Kothari, 1989), firms 
have incentives to separate permanent and transitory earnings components. 
However, earnings measurement and disclosure is constrained by GAAP and subject 
to monitoring. In their search for more flexible ways to convey information about 
3 
 
earnings persistence managers have turned to voluntarily disclose non-GAAP in 
earnings press releases. These earnings measures are calculated by managers, who 
make adjustments to GAAP earnings. Prior research suggests that investors perceive 
non-GAAP earnings to be informative (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bradshaw and 
Sloan, 2002), but there are concerns that managers might use non-GAAP disclosures 
strategically to positively bias investors’ perceptions (Andersson and Hellman, 
2007; Bhattacharya et al., 2007; Cormier et al., 2011).  
In contrast to the US where market regulation exists (Regulation G), in 
Europe non-GAAP disclosure is virtually unregulated. In addition, capital markets 
and institutional mechanisms are less developed in Europe than in the US, which 
suggests that the potential for these disclosures to mislead investors can be high, 
particularly when it comes to less sophisticated investors. The European Financial 
Reporting Advisory Group, an organization which provides the European 
Commission with technical advice on accounting matters, has stressed that non-
GAAP disclosures by large European firms is inconsistent and obscure (EFRAG, 
2009). Aware about these concerns the European Securities and Markets Authority 
recently published a set of guidelines for the disclosure of non-GAAP measures 
(ESMA 2015). 
The disclosure of non-GAAP earnings is not the only communication tool 
that managers may use to manage investor perceptions. Earnings press releases offer 
great flexibility not only in terms of content but also in terms of format and style of 
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the message.1 Managers try to positively influence user’s perceptions of firm 
performance by locating financial measures more prominently in the press release 
(Files et al., 2009; Garcia Osma and Guillamon-Saorin, 2011; Huang et al., 2013), 
by repeating information they wish investors to focus on (Garcia Osma and 
Guillamon-Saorin, 2011), by using positive tone (Garcia Osma and Guillamon-
Saorin, 2011; Huang et al., 2014), by reinforcing the positive or negative tone 
(Garcia Osma and Guillamon-Saorin, 2011) and by selecting benchmarks that give 
the impression of performance achievement (Garcia Osma and Guillamon-Saorin, 
2011; Lewellen et al., 1996; Schrand and Walther, 2000)). We refer to these 
communication strategies as impression management. Whether or not investors 
perceive the use of impression management in association with non-GAAP 
disclosures as misleading is an important empirical question. If European investors 
are capable of recognizing potentially misleading disclosures then strict regulation, 
which is costly to design and to enforce, may not be necessary.  
We first test whether non-GAAP disclosures are more likely to be 
opportunistic when associated with high impression management. One possibility is 
                                                 
1 Press releases are widely used by the business community and offer ample opportunity for 
discretionary disclosures. Prior research finds evidence of strategic use of communication techniques, 
such as positive language tone, to influence investors’ perceptions about firm performance (Huang et 
al., 2014; Lang and Lundholm, 2000). Prior studies also find the use of impression management to be 
associated with other strategic behaviour, such as earnings management (Aerts and Cheng, 2011; 
Godfrey et al., 2003).  
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that managers adjust GAAP earnings for recurring expenses, resulting in non-GAAP 
earnings that overstate permanent earnings. In the spirit of Frankel et al. (2011) and 
Jennings and Marques (2011) we analyze the cross-sectional variation in the 
persistence of non-GAAP adjustments to make inferences about informative versus 
opportunistic intentions. Consistent with these studies we find that the non-GAAP 
adjustments made by large European firms are recurring in nature. Furthermore, we 
extend this literature by documenting that when the non-GAAP disclosures are 
accompanied by a high level of impression management the adjustments made are 
more persistent (i.e., of lower quality).  
We hand-collect data and hand-code non-GAAP and impression 
management practices from the firms’ earnings announcements press releases. We 
use content analysis to construct a firm-year score capturing the level of impression 
management related to non-GAAP disclosures. The score captures three specific 
communication techniques: disclosure tone, emphasis, and performance 
comparisons.2 Our measure includes qualitative and quantitative information, as the 
                                                 
2 One could argue that, given the difficulty of identifying who writes the press release (Garcia Osma 
and Guillamon-Saorin, 2011; Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007), it is unlikely that the person 
preparing the press release is the same person who determines the non-GAAP exclusions and its 
presentation in the press release. The contra argument is that the manager is the person accountable 
for the content of the press release. Given the lack of evidence in the literature, we can assume that 
the quality of firm communication is an equilibrium outcome (Ball, 2006), which implies consistent 
quality levels across the range of reported information prepared within a firm, regardless of the 
number of parties involved (Gronstedt, 1996). This leads to the general expectation that impression 
management and non-GAAP information are positively associated.  
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combination of numbers and words can either be used to (i) help increase the clarity 
of a disclosure or (ii) increase the potential of the disclosure to mislead. Our score is, 
therefore, more comprehensive than a simple language tone measure. 
Our first hypothesis explores whether investors’ reaction to non-GAAP 
disclosures around the earnings announcement date varies with the level of 
impression management. In line with prior studies, which use US data, we find an 
overall positive market response to non-GAAP disclosures. However, we do not find 
a significant reaction when non-GAAP disclosures are accompanied by high 
impression management. This result suggests that investors interpret this 
combination as a possible managerial attempt to mask the persistence of the non-
GAAP adjustments made. This evidence is in line with prior work indicating that 
investors incorporate the tone of managers’ communications in their earnings 
valuation decisions (Baginski et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2012; Demers and Vega, 
2011), but that they are capable of detecting managers’ strategic use of 
communication techniques (Barton and Mercer, 2005; Huang et al., 2014). Another 
important result of our study is that the market reaction is not limited to language 
tone. We find a similar market reaction to other communication techniques, such as 
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emphasis and performance comparisons, both as a component of the impression 
management score and individually.3 
We subsequently evaluate the extent to which countries’ institutional and 
market conditions influence investors’ reaction to the combination of non-GAAP 
disclosure and high impression management. International literature documents that 
institutional and economic factors such as the level of investors’ protection, the 
quality of enforcement mechanisms, and the sophistication of market participants 
affect reporting transparency (Bushman et al., 2004; Holthausen, 2009; Lang et al., 
2012). Investors are also more likely to have the means to perceive and discount 
aggressive disclosures in these environments. Our results are consistent with this 
argument. We find that the market reaction to the combination of non-GAAP 
disclosures with high impression management is more negative in countries with 
more sophisticated market participants (i.e. financial analysts and institutional 
investors), and stronger investor protection. This evidence suggests that developed 
capital markets are better able to detect and to penalize firms for strategic non-
GAAP disclosures. The results are robust to endogeneity and selection bias. 
                                                 
3 Prior research finds that, in the US, investors are sensitive to the location of non-GAAP measures, 
when compared with the location of GAAP figures, and that location can be used strategically by 
managers (Elliott, 2006). This measure is referred to as “relative emphasis” in Bowen et al. (2005). 
Our measure is more comprehensive than the ones used before, as it includes not only location but 
also repetition and reinforcement (See Figure 1). 
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This study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature in three ways. 
First, it indicates that managers complement disclosures of non-GAAP financial 
measures with impression management techniques. While prior research studies on 
management communication focus mostly on language tone, we investigate a wide 
range of impression management techniques, related to qualitative and quantitative 
information, and assess the market reaction to the combination of these techniques 
with non-GAAP disclosures. Second, we provide evidence that investors’ reaction to 
the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings with high impression management varies with 
institutional and economic conditions. Third, we provide some useful insights for 
European regulators, given that the recent guidelines do not apply to press releases.  
The design of a regulatory solution can take into account that markets seem to be 
able to identify certain strategic non-GAAP disclosures, particularly sophisticated 
markets.   
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Investors use earnings information to predict future earnings and future 
returns. The accuracy of these predictions depends on earnings persistence, and prior 
research suggests that market participants reward persistence (Collins and Kothari, 
1989). The possibility of market rewards, as well as reputation and compensation 
motives, gives managers’ incentives to provide investors self-constructed earnings 
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measures that exclude transitory items from GAAP earnings. Consistent with this 
idea, extant studies on the informativeness of non-GAAP earnings report that 
investors perceive non-GAAP performance measures to be more informative about 
future earnings than GAAP earnings (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bradshaw and 
Sloan, 2002). 
However, because non-GAAP earnings disclosed in Europe during the 
period we analyze are not monitored, and are based mostly on the exclusion of 
expenses, there is a potential to use them with misleading intentions. While some 
managers may adjust GAAP earnings to provide a better measure of permanent 
earnings, others may exclude recurring earnings components in an attempt to 
enhance investors’ perceptions of the persistence of firm’s profitability. Whether or 
not the users of non-GAAP  information can see through managers’ strategic 
disclosures depends upon their knowledge and ability to detect them (Christensen et 
al., 2014).  Andersson and Hellman’s (2007) experimental evidence in an European 
context suggests that even financial analysts can be misled by non-GAAP 
disclosures. European markets are typically viewed as having lower presence of 
sophisticated investors (Ferreira and Matos, 2008), weaker investor protection, and 
poorer enforcement quality than US markets (La Porta et al., 2006). These 
conditions may prompt more aggressive non-GAAP reporting. Accordingly, given 
the European market characteristics, it is not clear, ex ante, that investors will be 
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able to detect impression management ploys and appropriately discount the non-
GAAP adjustments. Our paper examines this important question.  
We predict that managers use impression management techniques, a 
cosmetic disclosure strategy involving potentially misleading practices (such as 
disclosure tone effects, strategic presentation of performance comparisons or 
emphasis), to hide the recurring nature of certain non-GAAP adjustments.  
Frankel et al. (2011) and Jennings and Marques (2011) examine the cross-
sectional variation in the persistence of non-GAAP adjustments to make inferences 
about managers’ opportunistic versus informative intentions.  They argue that if the 
excluded items are purely transitory, their persistence should be close to zero, 
consistent with managers’ claims that the adjustments are informative. On the 
contrary, evidence that managers adjust for recurring earnings components is a 
signal of misleading intentions. Frankel et al. (2011) find that non-GAAP 
adjustments are less persistent than other earnings components but that they are not 
completely transitory. We contend that when managers exclude recurring expenses 
they use impression management in their earnings communications to persuade 
investors that the non-GAAP figures represent persistent earnings better than GAAP 
earnings and are, therefore, more informative.  
Our argument of strategic disclosure is in line with the growing evidence on 
the use of impression management practices in earnings announcement press 
releases, such as language tone, to influence users’ perceptions of firm performance 
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(e.g. Tan et al., 2014).  Huang et al. (2014) find that managers strategically increase 
positive tone when they have incentives to manipulate perceptions, such as the 
desire to meet earnings benchmarks. However, language tone is just one of the 
impression management techniques that managers can use to influence investors’ 
perceptions of non-GAAP performance. Managers may also use emphasis by 
location, by repetition, by reinforcement or performance comparisons to enhance the 
impression of corporate achievements (Bowen et al., 2005; Files et al., 2009; Garcia 
Osma and Guillamon-Saorin, 2011; Huang et al., 2013; Lewellen et al., 1996; 
Schrand and Walther, 2000).  
To capture these alternative communication techniques we create an 
impression management score associated with non-GAAP measures4. If managers 
use impression management to enhance the creditability of their non-GAAP 
earnings measures and to obscure the recurring nature of their adjustments then the 
impression management score will be greater when managers’ non-GAAP 
adjustments are more persistent. This prediction leads us to question whether or not 
investors can see through potentially opportunistic non-GAAP disclosures. 
                                                 
4 Qualitative information is subject to interpretation by readers and can be easily biased (Behn and 
Vaupel, 1982). For this reason, managers who intend to persuade users to embrace a certain belief are 
likely to make more use of qualitative disclosures. Quantitative disclosures, on the other hand, are 
more precise and can be verified ex-post (Healy and Palepu, 2001), but they can also be biased by 
managers through presentation techniques. For these reasons, a combination of both qualitative and 
quantitative information, which yields a more comprehensive score, is used in our study. 
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Several empirical studies document the capital market effects of manager 
communication practices such as disclosure tone (Baginski et al., 2011; Davis and 
Tama-Sweet, 2012). The fact that investors incorporate tone in their stock valuations 
is not the same as saying that they are not aware of self-serving management 
communications tactics. “Cheap talk” models predict that corporate communication 
is costless, non-binding, and unverifiable, and therefore ignored by investors 
(Bhattacharya and Krishnan, 1999; Crawford and Sobel, 1982).  
Evidence consistent with both the informational and “cheap talk” arguments 
suggests that the receivers of management communications are capable of 
distinguishing between more- and less-credible messages. In line with this argument, 
Barton and Mercer (2005) study how financial analysts react to management 
explanations that blame poor performance on temporary external events. They find 
that investors punish managers that attribute their poor results to external events 
unrelated to corporate performance and conclude that while reasonable arguments 
are accepted by analysts, hard-to-believe explanations backfire. Tan et al. (2014) 
find experimental evidence suggesting that when readability is low, sophisticated 
investors are more likely to consider the use of positive language less credible, 
which has a negative influence on their earnings’ judgments. This evidence suggests 
that investors can penalize firms when they perceive that managers use the 
discretion allowed in corporate communications to overstate performance. If 
investors respond similarly in the case of non-GAAP disclosures then they will 
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interpret non-GAAP measures communicated with high impression management as 
a sign of misleading intentions (i.e., as an attempt to portray recurring expenses as 
transitory expenses). As a result, we should observe a negative market reaction to 
non-GAAP earnings disclosures with high impression management, assuming that 
lower quality exclusions are associated with higher impression management. On the 
other hand, if market participants are not able to see through the strategic 
combination of the two disclosure mechanisms, then there will be no difference in 
the reaction to non-GAAP information with higher or with lower impression 
management. We state our first hypothesis in the alternative form as follows:  
HYPOTHESIS 1: Investors react differently to non-GAAP disclosures that are 
combined with high impression management in earnings announcements. 
 
European markets are  characterized by wide variation in (i) market 
sophistication, (ii) regulation, and (iii) enforcement (Bushman et al., 2004; La Porta 
et al., 2006). Since country-level institutional conditions affect both managers’ 
disclosure practices and investors’ decisions, it is likely that the market response to 
non-GAAP disclosures combined with high impression management also varies 
across market characteristics.  
We focus on two important country characteristics that are likely to affect 
investor reaction to non-GAAP information: (1) market’s sophistication and (2) 
strength of regulation aimed at protecting minority investors. A higher level of 
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overall market sophistication should be associated with a richer information 
environment and a better understanding of managers’ strategic choices. 
Sophisticated users, such as analysts and institutional investors, collectively 
produce, gather, validate, and disseminate information to the market. These 
activities result in improvements in corporate transparency and in information 
environment (Bushman et al., 2004). Hence, we anticipate that investors are more 
likely to perceive the combination of non-GAAP figures with high impression 
management as a strategic disclosure tactic in sophisticated markets. If investors 
discount managers’ non-GAAP adjustments with high impression management, then 
we expect the discount to be stronger in countries with a higher presence of 
sophisticated market participants. We expect a similar effect in a setting where 
enforcement of investor protection against self-dealing by the controlling 
shareholder is stronger. Both a desirable regulation and an efficient enforcement 
mechanism seem to be necessary for the development of capital markets and for the 
improvement in managers’ reporting practices (Holthausen, 2009; La Porta et al., 
1998).  
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  Following these arguments, we state our second hypothesis as follows:   
HYPOTHESIS 2: If investors react to the combination of non-GAAP disclosures and 
high impression management in earnings announcements negatively, this 
reaction is more negative in countries with more sophisticated users and 
stronger enforcement. 
 
III. SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURE AND HAND-COLLECTION 
OF DATA 
 Our initial sample comprises all industrial firms included in the Financial 
Times 2006 classification of the 500 largest European companies. This sample 
allows us to study a group of firms representing a considerable portion of European 
capital markets. It also allows us to investigate the effects of cross-country variation 
in market conditions, and to explore a setting where the potential effects of 
managers’ misleading practices can have a great impact. 
Our main source of data is the earnings announcement press releases which 
we gather from the companies’ websites and through Factiva. We analyze only those 
that are written in English, eliminating possible problems of incorrect translation. 
After eliminating observations for which we are unable to find press releases, our 
potential sample consists of 2,212 firm-year observations, covering fiscal years 2003 
to 2009. We read all press releases to identify those which include non-GAAP 
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disclosures. We find that 436 press releases do not include non-GAAP measures. 
We code non-GAAP measures and impression management techniques related to 
these measures, when they are located in the first two sections of the press release. 
These sections are considered the most prominent locations where managers are 
likely to create a “first positive impression” by emphasizing good news (Guillamon-
Saorin et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2013). We obtain data on financial items and 
market returns from Thomson Reuters Datastream and data on analysts’ forecasts 
from I/B/E/S. Country-level factors are from published sources. We eliminate 
observations with missing values in any variable, and observations from countries 
with less than ten firm-years. Table 1 reports that the final sample comprises 845 
observations corresponding to 243 firms. We next describe in detail how we obtain 
the data on non-GAAP disclosures and impression management.  
Non-GAAP earnings measures 
We hand-collect and code the type and the value of non-GAAP measures 
included in annual earnings announcement press releases. We compare non-GAAP 
earnings with GAAP earnings reported in the financial statements to calculate the 
value of the adjustments made by managers. Based on the categories of non-GAAP 
measures identified in earlier literature, we code the following non-GAAP earnings 
measures: (i) non-GAAP earnings per share, (ii) non-GAAP from continuing 
operations per share, (iii) non-GAAP net income, (iv) non-GAAP income from 
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continuing operations, and (v) adjusted versions of EBITDA and EBIT. We do not 
collect non-GAAP cash measures, adjusted values for sales, or ratios.  
Furthermore, in order to be conservative, we exclude non-GAAP financial 
measures with ambiguous labels and non-GAAP measures that are commonly used 
by the accounting and finance community (such as EBITDA and EBIT) because 
they can be viewed by capital market participants as GAAP measures. Unlike the 
situation in the US, in some European countries national accounting standards 
establish a defined format for the income statement, which includes subtotals as 
EBITDA and EBIT. That practice continued even after the introduction of IFRS. 
The measures studied in this paper are usually labeled in the press releases as 
“adjusted net income”, “net income excluding…”, and “adjusted earnings per 
share”. 
 Measuring impression management 
We perform a manual content analysis to obtain a score for impression 
management related to the non-GAAP figures disclosed in the earnings 
announcement press releases. Although potentially subjective, manual content 
analysis offers great flexibility to collect in detail a diverse range of practices that 
cannot be captured by computer-aid techniques (Linderman, 2001). For example, it 
is not possible to code performance comparisons using machine-based methods. 
Most textual analysis papers using machine-based methods focus mainly on generic 
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features of narrative disclosures such as length, tone, readability. Furthermore, 
research using computer-aided methods to investigate the tone of the announcement 
rely on pre-specified wordlists, which does not consider the fact that managers are 
likely to use a combined range of disclosure practices to impress users (Davis et al., 
2012; Rogers et al., 2011). Finally, Li (2010) suggests that computer-based methods 
of content analysis may not work well for analyzing corporate filings.  
We focus our content analysis in the most prominent locations of the press 
releases, as managers are likely to seek a “first positive impression” by emphasizing 
good news in the headlines. Research in psychology indicates that humans hold a 
cognitive bias that drives them to create a first opinion, and use subsequent 
information to support it. This tendency is termed “confirmatory bias” (Rabin and 
Schrag, 1999). Thus, when analyzing press releases one must pay attention to 
headlines as a strategic location for potential misleading disclosures (Guillamon-
Saorin et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2013).  
To code the impression management in each earnings announcement we follow 
the schema developed by Brennan et al. (2009) and empirically tested by Garcia 
Osma and Guillamon-Saorin (2011). We analyze the three impression management 
disclosure techniques described below.5  
                                                 
5 We do not consider selectivity as non-GAAP measures are not part of financial statements. 
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(1) Tone consists of using positive language, keywords, statements, or numerical 
amounts to create a positive image of corporate results that would not be 
achieved using more neutral statements. Our analysis of tone is based on 
qualitative and quantitative information related to non-GAAP figures. We 
categorize keywords as positive or negative based on a list of keywords 
(Abrahamson and Amir, 1996; Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Clatworthy and 
Jones, 2003) customized to include other keywords that appear in the press 
releases. For example, in “2003 net income adjusted for special items shows 
strong increase: +17% to 7.34 billion for results in euro” (Total, press release 
2003), “increase” is coded as a positive keyword related to a non-GAAP figure. 
We further classify all non-GAAP amounts included in the most- and next-most 
emphasized sections of earnings press releases as positive (negative) if current 
year amount is higher (lower) than previous year or if it is explicitly stated as 
positive or negative. In Total’s press release, income adjusted for special items is 
explicitly stated as positive and therefore coded as positive non-GAAP amount.  
(2) Emphasis consists of making a particular piece of information more obvious to 
the reader by using three strategies: (a) placing the information strategically in 
the press release (emphasis by location), (b) repeating the same piece of 
information in the press release (emphasis by repetition), and (c) reinforcing 
keywords by adding a qualifier to emphasize their connotation (emphasis by 
reinforcement). In Total’s 2003 press release, for example, the net income 
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adjusted for special items is located in the highlights and repeated again in the 
main text. This practice is coded as a repetition of a positive non-GAAP 
amount.6 Moreover, the word “strong” is coded as a positive reinforcement 
because it enhances the positive connotation of the positive keyword “increase”. 
(3) Performance comparisons relates to managers’ decisions to include a benchmark 
to compare with current year figures depending on the firm performance. Firms 
may also choose a benchmark strategically to show positive rather than negative 
changes. In Total’s 2003 press release the percentage “17%” is considered and 
coded as a reinforcement of the current year non-GAAP amount (7.34 billion).   
 Based on the three impression management practices described previously, 
we calculate an impression management score (NGIM). Figure 1 in the Appendix 
explains the methods followed to code and analyze the impression management 
techniques, using the 2006 press release of Yell Group as an example. For the 
qualitative information related to non-GAAP figures, we give each keyword a 
weight of 1. If the keyword appears in the most-emphasized section, we add a weigh 
of 1; for the next-most emphasized section, we add a weight of 0.5. If the keyword is 
reinforced, we add a weight of 0.5. If the statement is repeated, we add a weight of 
                                                 
6 Although it is common that information included in the headline is also included in the main body 
of the press release, we consider this practice as emphasis by repetition because it is up to the 
manager to (1) provide the press release with a headline (2) to include the same piece of information 
in the headline and in the main body of the press release. 
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0.5. Similarly, for the quantitative information, we give a weight of 1.0 to each non-
GAAP quantitative amount identified in the press release. If the quantitative amount 
appears in the most-emphasized section, we add a weight of 1; for the next-most 
emphasized section we add a weight of 0.5. If the quantitative amount is 
accompanied by a performance comparison, we add a weight of 0.5. If the 
quantitative amount is repeated, we add a weight of 0.5. These weights are either 
positive or negative depending on the keyword or amount positive or negative 
connotation. The final impression management score is calculated as the total 
composite score for all positive keywords and amounts minus the total composite 
score for all negative keywords and amounts, divided by the total number of words 
in the sections analyzed, as in earlier literature (Tetlock et al., 2008). This scaling 
allows for comparisons between press release sections of different lengths (Rogers 
et al., 2011). Figure 2 illustrates the calculation of the score. 
 
IV.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
We argue that managers may attempt to hide the persistence of non-GAAP 
adjustments by associating the disclosure of these figures to the use of impression 
management techniques. In order to assess whether this association exists we test the 
persistence of the non-GAAP adjustments disclosed with a high level of impression 
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management. We estimate a model similar to that used by Frankel et al. (2011) and 
Jennings and Marques (2011), as follows:   
 
EPSi,t+1 = α0 + α1NG_EPSi,t + α2NG_adjustmenti,t + 
α3High_NGIMi,t   +α4High_NGIM x NG_adjustmenti,t + 
α5High_NGIM x NG_adjustmenti ,t + FirmControlsi,t + 
TimeControlsi,t  + IndControlsi,t  + CountryControlsi,t  + μi,t                                               
(1) 
 
The dependent variable is GAAP earnings per share (EPS) for period t+1. 
We also estimate the model using operating income per share at t+1. Using 
operating income removes a potential mechanical relation between EPSt+1 and 
NG_adjustment resulting from recurring adjustments such as depreciation or 
amortization (Frankel et al., 2011).  
In classic persistence models, the independent variable of interest would be 
GAAP EPS for period t. Since we are interested in analyzing the persistence of non-
GAAP adjustments, and GAAP EPS is equal to non-GAAP EPS (NG_EPS) minus 
the non-GAAP adjustments on a per share basis (NG_adjustment), we use these two 
variables instead. If the non-GAAP adjustments are transitory items they should not 
be persistent and the estimated coefficient for NG_adjustment should not be 
statistically different from zero. However, given Frankel et al.’s (2011) and Jennings 
and Marques’ (2011) results, we anticipate that at least some of the adjustments are 
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recurring items. We expect to find a negative coefficient on NG_adjustment, 
because these exclusions are almost always expenses. The main variable of interest 
is the interaction term High_NGIM x NG_adjustment. High_NGIM is an indicator 
variable coded as one when the firm’s impression management score for non-GAAP 
disclosure is higher than the sample median score, and zero otherwise. A 
significantly negative coefficient indicates that the adjustments made by managers 
who use a high level of impression management are more persistent (i.e., they are of 
lower quality), consistent with our prediction.  
As in Frankel et al. (2011), we include the following some firm-level 
controls. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Growth is a common factor of three 
variables: book-to-market assets, average sales growth in the last three years, and 
capital expenditures to total assets. Loss is an indicator variable coded as one if the 
value of GAAP earnings is negative, and zero otherwise. ROA Volatility is 
calculated as the standard deviation of ROA (return on assets) over the previous 
three years. We also include year, industry (based on one-digit SIC codes), and 
country indicators. All variables are for firm i and year t. 
Our first hypothesis assesses whether market participants react differently to 
the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings that are communicated with high impression 
management. We use the following model to test it: 
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CAR = β0 + β1GAAP_surprisei,t + β2NG_adjustmenti,t  
            + β3High_NGIMi,t + β4 High_NGIM  x NG_adjustmenti,t  
            +  IndustryControlsi,t  + CountryControlsi,t  + εi,t 
(2) 
 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return for a three-day window centered on 
the date of the earnings announcement press release (k). CAR is calculated as              
Πk=-1,+1(1+ARk)-1, where AR is the abnormal return obtained from the Fama-French 
three factor model (Fama and French, 1993) estimated over the previous 365 days 
and ending on day k-2. Given the international nature of the sample, we use country-
specific risk factors, specifically market premium, size, and book-to-market 
international risk factors obtained from Ferreira et al. (2012, 2013).  
The definition of variables GAAP_surprise and NG_adjustment is based on 
Marques’ (2006) methodology but takes into consideration the measurement issues 
discussed in Cohen et al. (2007) and Bradshaw et al. (2014). Given that I/B/E/S 
provides GAAP forecasts as well as non-GAAP forecasts, these two measures are 
used to calculate GAAP surprise and non-GAAP surprise, respectively.7 We split the 
total earnings surprise of non-GAAP earnings measures (i.e., the difference between 
                                                 
7 Marques (2006) considers I/B/E/S consensus forecasts as the benchmark to compute GAAP 
surprise because no other analysts’ forecast data was available at that time. The fact that this 
practice introduces measurement error is pointed out by Cohen et al. (2007). Now that there are two 
sets of I/B/E/S forecasts available (GAAP and non-GAAP) this practice is no longer necessary. 
Bradshaw et al.’s (2014) findings indicate that after correcting for measurement error non-GAAP 
earnings are more informative to investors than GAAP earnings, even in settings that previously 
generated inconclusive results.  
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non-GAAP earnings and the median consensus non-GAAP earnings forecast) into 
two components. The first component is GAAP_surprise, and it is calculated as the 
difference between GAAP earnings per share and the median consensus GAAP 
earnings forecast, scaled by share price at the end of the previous year. The second 
component is NG_adjustment, representing the adjustments made by managers to 
obtain non-GAAP earnings. It is calculated as the difference between non-GAAP 
and GAAP earnings per share, scaled by share price at the end of the previous year.8 
If non-GAAP earnings are more valuable to financial markets than GAAP earnings, 
the estimated coefficient for NG_adjustment (β2) should be positive. We expect a 
positive coefficient for High_NGIM (β3) as prior literature provides evidence that 
the tone of corporate narratives influences the market valuations positively (Davis et 
al., 2012). 
Our focus is on the coefficient of the interaction between High_NGIM and 
NG_adjustment (β4). If market participants do not understand managers’ attempts to 
promote their overstated versions of earnings through the use of a high level of 
impression management, then the coefficient β4 should be positive and statistically 
significant. However, if investors interpret earnings announcements containing non-
GAAP information combined with high impression management as an attempt to 
                                                 
8 We note that the variable NG_adjustment is unscaled in equation (1), whereas in equations (2) and 
(3) it is scaled by share price. 
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camouflage the recurring nature of non-GAAP adjustments, there are two possible 
scenarios: either they ignore it or they react negatively. In the first scenario, we 
expect the estimated coefficient β4 to be zero, while in the second we expect the 
coefficient to be negative (which can be interpreted as a punishment for managers’ 
behavior).  
Hypothesis 2 states that if investors react to the combination of non-GAAP 
disclosures and high impression management negatively, this reaction is more 
negative in countries with more sophisticated users and stronger enforcement. To 
test this proposition, we extend model (2) as follows: 
CAR = γ0 + γ1GAAP_surprisei,t + γ2NG_adjustmenti,t + γ3High_NGIMi,t  
+ γ4 High_NGIM x NG_adjustmenti,t + γ5 High_Country  
+ γ6 High_NGIM x NG_adjustmenti,t x High_Country  
+  IndControls i,t  + υi,t 
(3) 
 
We use two measures to assess the level of sophistication of capital markets. 
The first is the percentage of institutional investment to market capitalization in the 
country, from Ferreira and Matos (2008). The second is the number of analysts in a 
country as reported in Bae et al. (2008). We assess the strength of investor 
protection with the anti-self-dealing index created by Djankov et al. (2008). To 
facilitate the interpretation of results for each of the country measure, we create 
indicator variables coded as one if the country’s value, for each variable, is above 
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the sample median, and zero otherwise. These are mentioned as High_Country in 
equation (3). 
The main focus of model (3) is the coefficient of the three-way interaction 
term High_NGIM  x NG_adjustment x High_Country (γ6). Consistent with 
hypothesis 2, we expect γ6 to be significantly negative. The definitions of the 
remaining variables and expected coefficients are as discussed previously for model 
(2). All variables are for firm i and year t. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and univariate tests  
 Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the non-GAAP impression 
management score (NGIM), the non-GAAP adjustments made by managers and 
country factors, all by country. The mean NGIM score is positive for all countries, 
indicating an overall positive impression in the sample press releases. We find the 
highest NGIM score in Ireland (0.060) and the lowest in Hungary (0.001). A score 
of 0.060 means that in every 100 words analyzed there are six points more of 
positively biased content than negative biased content. Hungary’s score indicates a 
more neutral content.  
 The mean values of the adjustments (both unscaled and scaled by market 
price) vary substantially, suggesting the existence of country-level effects. The mean 
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of the country-level variables also vary substantially, which encourages our belief 
that differences in institutional and economic conditions are likely to result in 
differences in the market reaction to non-GAAP disclosures. Hungary has the lowest 
percentage of institutional ownership (8.8%) and Finland and Sweden have the 
highest (33.8%). The number of analysts ranges from a minimum of 34 (Hungary) to 
a maximum of 1,272 (France). Investor protection score is highest in the U.K. (0.93) 
and lowest in Hungary (0.20).  
 Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables 
included in our models. The mean GAAP_surprise is -0.017, indicating that on 
average GAAP earnings misses analysts’ GAAP forecasts by approximately 0.2 
cents (per each Euro of its price). On average, non-GAAP earnings are higher than 
GAAP earnings as the mean NG_adjustment is 0.035. The positive mean is 
consistent with prior evidence and results from managers’ excluding mostly 
expenses. Panel B of Table 3 presents Pearson correlations and their level of 
significance. Correlations are generally low. The NGIM score is positively 
correlated with CAR and NG_adjustment. 
 Table 4 presents univariate tests of the association between impression 
management and several aggressive non-GAAP disclosure practices. Black and 
Christensen (2009) find that managers intentionally exclude recurring items, such as 
R&D, depreciation and amortization, stock-based compensation, and tax items. This 
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is considered an aggressive reporting practice, as it may mislead investors. The 
univariate results in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that the level of the NGIM score is 
higher when firms make adjustments for recurring items. This finding is consistent 
with a strategic use of the combination of non-GAAP disclosures and the use of 
impression management techniques.  We also find that firms that disclose non-
GAAP figures with higher emphasis than GAAP figures tend to have a significantly 
higher impression management score (Panel B).9 Moreover, we observe that firms 
than beat analysts’ forecasts only on a non-GAAP basis (i.e., when GAAP earnings 
miss the benchmarks) disclose non-GAAP measures with higher impression 
management (Panel C).   
 
Results for the persistence analysis   
Table 5 reports estimation results for the two versions of model (1). As 
expected, the coefficients of NG_EPS are positive and statistically significant, which 
is an indication that future earnings are associated with current earnings. Consistent 
with our expectations and prior evidence, we find that some of the managers’ 
adjustments are persistent. The estimated coefficients of NG_adjustment are 
negative (values are -0.476 and -0.703) and statistically significant. The estimated 
                                                 
9 We caution that our impression management score includes measures of emphasis and thus it is not 
surprising that impression management and the emphasis of non-GAAP earnings are positively 
related.  
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coefficients for the interaction variable High_NGIM x NG_adjustment are negative 
and significant, in both versions of the model. In other words, the non-GAAP 
adjustments made by the High_NGIM group are more recurring (i.e., of lower 
quality). This is consistent with our argument that managers use communication 
strategically in an attempt to mask the persistence of the adjustments, and portray 
non-GAAP earnings as a better measure of recurring performance than GAAP 
earnings.    
 
Results for the market reaction (H1) 
We now test whether investors react to non-GAAP disclosures that are 
combined with high impression management. Table 6, Column (1) presents the 
results for a base model that includes only the GAAP_surprise and the constant term. 
As expected, the estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that the market interprets the announcement of GAAP results above 
analysts’ expectations as good news. In column (2) we add NG_adjustment to the 
model. This version of the model examines whether the market perceives alternative 
earnings numbers voluntarily disclosed by managers to be relevant information, in 
addition to that conveyed by GAAP. This effect has been established in US markets, 
but to the best of our knowledge, has never been tested internationally. The positive 
and statistically significant coefficient (coefficient = 0.061, t-statistic = 2.44) is 
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consistent with the notion that non-GAAP information has incremental information 
content and previous results. This result can be interpreted as the investors’ 
perception that the non-GAAP adjustments lead to a higher earnings surprise than 
that indicated by the GAAP figure. In column (3) we test whether there is a market 
reaction for the use of a high level of impression management accompanying non-
GAAP disclosures. Our results indicate that the market, in general, reacts positively 
this disclosure practice.  
Column (4) of Table 6 presents the results of estimating model (2). The 
coefficient of interest, High_NGIM x NG_adjustment, is negative (-0.130) and 
statistically significant (t-statistic = -5.78), indicating the market has a lower market 
reaction to non-GAAP adjustments when the disclosure of the non-GAAP is 
accompanied by a high level of impression management. The abnormal return for 
the non-GAAP adjustments, when the disclosure of non-GAAP is accompanied by a 
low or moderate level of impression management is 0.125, whereas the reaction to 
the adjustments, when the non-GAAP disclosure is accompanied by high impression 
management is economically and statistically zero (0.125 – 0.130). This empirical 
evidence suggests investors ignore non-GAAP information when managers 
communicate that information aggressively. Given our persistence results, one 
possible explanation is that investors perceive the aggressive communication style as 
an attempt to inflate the firm’s operating profitability and penalize managers for it.  
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The remaining coefficients in column (4) are in line with the results in the 
previous estimations. The positive estimated coefficient for High_NGIM (0.046) is 
consistent with prior evidence of a general positive market reaction to the use of 
communication techniques to convey earnings information.  
One could wonder whether the effect observed for non-GAAP impression 
management is a spill-over effect of general impression management. To test this 
possibility, we add to the model a measure of impression management that captures 
the impression management used on the remaining information. We create an 
indicator variable, High_OtherIM, coded as one when the impression management 
in the text unrelated to non-GAAP disclosures is above the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. We then interact the indicator variable with GAAP_suprise, and include it 
in the model. The estimated coefficient for High_NGIM and its interaction with 
NG_adjustment remain significant, indicating that there is an effect for general 
impression management that is different from that observed for non-GAAP 
disclosures. 
 
Results of country-level effects (H2) 
Hypothesis 2 states that if investors react negatively to the combination of 
non-GAAP disclosures and impression management this penalty is stronger in 
countries with more sophisticated markets, and with stronger enforcement. To test it 
33 
 
we interact High_NGIM x NG_adjustment with the indicator variable 
High_Country, which is coded as one when the country has score above the sample 
median in each of the three country factors (percentage of institutional investors, 
number of financial analysts, and private enforcement of anti-self dealing), 
considered separately, and zero otherwise. Table 7 presents the results. The negative 
and statistically significant coefficients of High_NGIM x NG_adjustment x 
High_Country indicate that the market reaction to non-GAAP adjustments that are 
accompanied by high impression management is lower for firms from countries with 
a higher presence of institutional investors and analysts, and with strong 
enforcement of minority investors’ rights.    
We next combine the three country variables in principal components. This 
exercise helps to understand the relative importance of each country factor, and 
whether they capture different institutional features. We identify two principal 
factors with eingenvalues greater than one. The variables percentage of institutional 
investors and number of analysts have the highest loadings in factor one, so we 
name factor one SOPH (for sophistication). Investor protection loads almost 
exclusively in the second factor, and thus we name it PROT. Column (4) presents 
the results of estimating a model with the two principal components. The estimated 
coefficients for High_NGIM x NG_adjustment x High_SOPH and High_NGIM x 
NG_adjustment x High_PROT are negative and statistically significant, and there is 
no statistical difference between them. This result suggests that the country factors 
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are equally relevant and capture different aspects of the information and regulatory 
environment of our sample countries. Overall, our results are consistent with H2 and 
can be interpreted as evidence that developed markets penalize the firms that 
strategically use communication techniques to diminish the transparency of non-
GAAP disclosures.  
 
VI.  ADDITIONAL ANALYSES  
Selection and endogenity issues 
Our main analyses are based on cases that disclose non-GAAP earnings 
measures in the same section in which we measure impression management. This 
requirement ensures that the impression management score is directly related to non-
GAAP reporting, but creates potential selection problems. These problems arise 
because we analyze only firms that choose to disclose non-GAAP information, and 
that choice is likely to be a result of specific conditions rather than a random choice. 
To address this concern we estimate a two-step selection model (Heckman, 1979), 
assuming NG_adjustment to be an endogenous decision of managers. The selection 
equation models the decision to disclose a non-GAAP figure in the earnings 
announcements, considering determinants previously identified in the literature (e.g. 
Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Marques, 2006). The selection 
results are consistent with our previous results (Table 8). The coefficients on the 
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interaction terms of interest, High_NGIM x NG_adjustment and its interactions with 
the country-level variables, are negative and statistically significant.  
 
Alternative measures of impression management 
Our impression management score incorporates three different techniques: 
tone, emphasis, and performance comparisons. In order to assess the market effects 
of the individual techniques we re-estimate model (2) for each individual technique. 
We obtain similar results for all three techniques, as the three estimated coefficients 
for the interaction term NGIM_technique x NG_adjustment are negative and 
statistically significant.  
Next, we test the sensitivity of our findings to alternative measures of 
impression management. Our first approach is to repeat the analysis using an 
industry adjusted measure of impression management. The second is to calculate an 
abnormal measure of impression management similar to that proposed by Huang et 
al. (2013). The abnormal impression management is the residual of a regression of 
non-GAAP impression management on firm characteristics that are likely to 
determine the use of impression management. We include changes in ROA and loss, 
as managers might use impression management to mask undesirable performance. 
We also use abnormal accruals, which proxies for earnings management, size, and 
leverage. In general the results are qualitatively similar.  
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Finally, we change the weighting scheme of the impression management 
score, as weights can be subjective (Beattie et al., 2004). We repeat our empirical 
tests using an unweighted impression management score. We also use weights that 
are twice those initially assigned to tone for emphasis and performance comparisons. 
The idea is that these characteristics are likely to enhance more the positiveness or 
negativeness of information than tone. Again our conclusions remain qualitatively 
the same.  
 
Machine-based measures 
The manual content analysis applied in this study allows us to obtain a measure of 
impression management that is specifically tailored for non-GAAP disclosures, and 
covers several communication techniques. However, manual content analysis can 
introduce subjectivity in the analysis. To test the robustness of our results we 
construct three machine-based measures of language tone. We focus only on tone 
because commonly used machine-based methods are typically developed to capture 
tone. The three measures of language tone are based on: (i) the Loughran and 
McDonald dictionary, (ii) the Harvard dictionary (Loughran and McDonald, 2011; 
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Loughran and McDonald, 2015), and (iii) the list of words derived from our 
manual content analysis.10  
Similarly to the impression management analysis, we convert the scores 
obtained into indicator variables, using the sample median (we name the variable 
High_Tone). The market reaction results for the machine-coded scores are similar to 
those presented in tables 6 and 7, but slightly weaker. For example, the coefficients 
and correspondent t-statistics for the interaction term in equation 2 (High_Tone x 
NG_adjustment) are -0.094 (t-stat = -1.45) in the case of Loughran and McDonald 
score, -0.092 (t-stat=-1.73) for the Harvard dictionary score, and -0.093 (t-stat=-
1.82) for the score based on our own wordlist. For the interaction terms with 
country-level variables in equation 3 the results are again similar.11 We believe the 
weaker results are a consequence of two factors. First, the machine-coded score 
captures only tone and ignores other communication techniques which are captured 
                                                 
10 The Loughran and McDonald list is available at http://www.nd.edu/∼mcdonald/Word Lists.html. 
The Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary, is available through the GI website (see 
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/∼inquirer/). The list derived from the manual content analysis of the 
press releases included in this study is available upon request. The Loughran and McDonald list and 
the Harvard list are chosen because they have been widely used in accounting and finance research. 
However, they have also been criticised. First, the Harvard list is developed for psychological 
research and includes words which are not common in a finance context (e.g. mine or cancer) and it 
has been argued that it misclassifies words in financial applications (Loughran and McDonald, 
2011). Second, the Loughran and McDonald list is developed for corporate 10K but it is biased 
towards a negative content (the list includes 354 positive words and 2,329 negative words). 
11 We run nine different specifications of equation 3 (3 country-level factors * 3 dictionaries). For 
“number of analysts” and “investor protection” the 3-way interaction term (High_Tone x 
NG_adjustment x High_country) is negative and statistically significant for all three dictionaries. But 
it is statistically stronger in the case of our own wordlist. For “percentage of institutional investors” 
the interaction term is always negative but not statistically significant.  
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by our main score. Second, the lists are not developed with announcements of 
financial data in mind. Overall, we conclude that computer-based methods of 
content analysis may not work as well as manual analysis for studying specific 
aspects of corporate disclosures.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Managers use the flexibility allowed by earnings announcement press 
releases to disclose non-GAAP earnings measures that exclude transitory 
components, and are potentially a better presentation of permanent earnings. But the 
discretionary nature of non-GAAP calculations also creates opportunities to mislead 
investors. This possibility is intensified in environments where there are no stringent 
rules on non-GAAP reporting, investor protection is weaker, and investors’ 
sophistication is low. In addition, the flexibility allowed by earnings announcement 
press releases offers managers the opportunity to use communication techniques (i.e. 
impression management) to persuade investors and other users that their non-GAAP 
disclosures are a good representation of the firm’s persistent profitability.  
For a sample of large European firms, we find that managers exclude 
recurring items from non-GAAP earnings, and that they use high impression 
management to mask that recurring nature in an attempt to overstate firms’ 
performance. We also find that investors seem to understand that strategic disclosure 
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behavior as they react negatively to the disclosure of non-GAAP information that is 
combined with impression management. Our evidence suggests that the market 
players correctly identify high impression management as an attempt to positively 
bias their perception about the persistence of non-GAAP earnings. Finally, we 
analyze whether the market reactions vary with country-level conditions such as 
users’ sophistication and protection of minority shareholders rights. Our results 
indicate that in countries with sophisticated users and strong investor protection the 
penalty for potentially misleading disclosures is higher. We conduct a number of 
robustness checks, including replacing our manually constructed score of impression 
management by a machine-coded score, and find similar results. 
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Appendix  
Measuring Impression Management 
 
Yell Group plc- Final Results   
8097 words 
23 May 2006 
07:01 
Regulatory News Service 
English 
(c) 2006 All Rights Reserved.  
RSN Number: 3958D Yell Group plc 23 May 2006 
Yell Group plc financial results for the year ended 31 March 2006 
 
 
 
Strong growth across all business. Successful integration of TransWestern 
Most 
emphasized 
section 
 
-- Group revenue up 26.1% to £1,621.3 million 
-- Group adjusted EBITDA up Keyword+ 28.0% Bench+ to  £502.9 NUM+ NG million 
-- Adjusted profit after tax up Keyword+ 26.1%  Bench+ to £233.6 NUM+ NG million 
-- Group operating cash conversion of 88.9% compared to 88.4% last year 
--Adjusted diluted earnings per share up Keyword+ 25.2% Bench+ to 32.8 NUM+ NG pence 
-- Proposed final dividend up 21.4% to 10.2 pence per share 
Next most 
emphasised 
section 
 
Statutory results (unaudited)  
                                                                                  2005              2006             Change 
Revenue                                                                 1,285.3           1,621.3            26.1% 
Operating profit                                                        327.7              449.9             37.3% 
Profit after tax                                                          162.5               212.3            30.6% 
Cash generated from operations                              357.8               411.5            15.0% 
Diluted earnings per share (pence)                            22.9                29.7              29.7% 
 
Least 
emphasised 
section 
Key: NUM+/-=positive/negative amount, Bench+/-= positive/negative performance comparisons, 
Keyword+/-=positive/negative keyword 
NG= Non-GAAP figure 
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We illustrate impression management practices using a specific press release of a company included 
in our sample: Yell Group plc, year of 2006. We perform manual content analysis, which allows a 
detailed scrutiny of the press release in search of potentially misleading disclosure practices. We 
manually code the three potentially misleading disclosure practices investigated in the current study. 
Each press release is assigned three levels of emphasis (most-, next-most and least- emphasized 
sections) and the qualitative and quantitative information is coded for each section separately. For the 
purposes of this study we focus on the first two sections of the press release (most- and next-most 
emphasized sections). 
The impression management score is calculated following the method included in Figure 1, and the 
calculation is in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 1: Method to measure impression management (management positiveness/negativeness) 
 
Technique Object of technique Measure 
(1) Tone Keywords 
 
Quantitative amounts 
Number of positive and negative 
keywords 
Number of quantitative positive 
and negative amounts 
(2) Emphasis (a)Location/positioning/presentation of 
keywords 
Location/positioning/presentation of 
amounts 
Most-, next-most emphasized 
section 
 
Most-, next-most emphasized 
section 
 (b) Repetition of statements 
 
Repetition of quantitative amounts 
 
(c) Reinforcement of keywords 
Number of positive and negative 
repetitions of statements 
Number of positive and negative 
repetitions of amounts 
Number of positive and negative 
reinforcements 
(3) Performance 
comparisons 
Quantitative amounts Benchmark, Previous year amount, 
Both 
 
42 
 
Figure 2: Calculating impression management score (NGIM) 
Measure Positive 
keywords
Negative 
keywords
Positive 
amounts
Negative
amounts
 Number of disclosures (Keywords and amounts) 3 0 3 0
 
 
 Impression management score (NGIM) 
Positive 
score
Negative 
score
Positive 
score
Negative 
score
(1) Disclosure of keywords and quantitative 
performance monetary and non-monetary amounts 
3x1.0 0x1.0 3x1.0 0x1.0
(2)(a) Emphasis – Location:  
          - Most-  0 x 1.0 0 x 1.0 0 x 0.0 0 x 0.0
          - Next-most  3 x 0.5 0 x0.5 3 x 0.5 0 x 0.5
 
(2)(b) Emphasis – Repetition 0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5
(2) (c) Emphasis – Reinforcement of keywords 0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5
(3) Performance comparisons  0 x 0.5 0 x 0.5 3 x 0.5 0 x 0.5
 
 
Total impression management score 4.5 0.0 6.0  0.0
 
NGIM Score calculation 
10.5Positive score –0.0 Negative score = 10.5Net positive score/74 Total number of words in sections coded = + 0.1418 
 
Although in this illustration we focus on the press release of Yell Group plc for 2006, our analysis 
involves the study of five consecutive years (2003 to 2009). Yell Group has a loss of £40.6 million in 
2003. In 2004 the company increases losses to £51.1 million, in 2005 it has a profit of £94.2 million, 
in 2006 profit goes up to £212.3 million. In 2007 the company has profit of £212.7 million and in 
2008 profit decreases to £206.7 million. In 2009 profit decreased dramatically to a loss of £1,141.4 
million. Despite this overall poor performance, the press releases for all years from 2003 up to 2009 
for Yell Group have a positive non-GAAP impression management score (NGIM) as measured in 
this study. This reflects an overall positive tone of the qualitative and quantitative information 
included in its press release. The IM Score for Yell Group is 0.00 for 2003, 0.061 for 2004, 0.094 for 
2005, 0.014 for 2006, 0.046 for 2007 and 2008, and 0.38 for 2009.  
The company did not include a non-GAAP amount in the sections analyzed for the 2003 press 
release. However, the company included three non-GAAP earnings figures in each of the following 
years from 2004 throughout 2009 in the prominent sections of the press releases analyzed in this 
study. In all cases the non-GAAP figures were positive (only one non-GAAP amount included in the 
sections analyzed of the press release for 2004 was neutral) and all included performance 
comparisons showing a positive change from earlier years. In all cases, the non-GAAP amounts were 
located in the second section of the press release, always before the GAAP earnings figures. In all 
cases, the non-GAAP figures included in the press release were larger than the GAAP figures. For 
example, in the press release for 2006 Yell Group included adjusted EBITDA (£502.9), adjusted 
profit after tax (£233.6), and adjusted diluted earnings per share (£32.8) - amounts are highlighted in 
the Appendix. The corresponding GAAP amounts were operating profit (£449.3), net income 
(£212.7), and diluted earnings per share (£27.09). The use of non-GAAP information and impression 
management is even more striking in the press release of 2009, where even though the company 
reported GAAP losses, all the non-GAAP figures in the press release were positive, and the NGIM 
score is positive. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample selection 
  Firm-years 
Financial Times top 500 European industrial companies, 
2003-2009 2,373 
Unavailable press releases -161 
2,212 
Firms without non-GAAP measures in press release -436 
1,776 
Firms with non-GAAP measures, but not in section 1 or 2 of 
the press release -170 
1,606 
Missing data on accounting, analysts, market, and country 
variables -761 
Final sample 845 
Corresponding to 243 firms   
This table shows the sample selection details. Numbers in parentheses are observations that 
are dropped. Observations from countries with less than ten firm-years were also 
eliminated. 
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TABLE 2 - Descriptive statistics by country 
Country N Mean 
NGIM 
score 
Mean 
NG_adjust. 
(unscaled) 
Mean 
NG_adjust. 
(scaled) 
Percentage 
institutional 
ownership 
Number 
analysts 
 
Investor 
protection 
score 
Austria 10 0.025 0.130 0.003 13.2 99 0.21 
Belgium 13 0.012 0.239 0.014 9.8 383 0.54 
Denmark 19 0.016 1.231 0.056 20.5 323 0.47 
Finland 23 0.008 0.148 0.009 33.8 331 0.46 
France 133 0.035 1.070 0.039 21.1 1,272 0.38 
Germany 61 0.031 0.259 0.012 21.0 807 0.28 
Greece 16 0.045 0.124 0.011 10.2 78 0.23 
Hungary 10 0.001 -0.159 -0.015 8.8 34 0.20 
Ireland 18 0.060 0.144 0.010 30.5 180 0.79 
Italy 33 0.011 0.150 0.015 13.6 736 0.39 
Netherlands 28 0.028 0.843 0.032 32.4 867 0.21 
Norway 17 0.015 1.326 0.191 21.1 269 0.44 
Portugal 13 0.011 -0.001 0.000 9.0 208 0.49 
Russia 14 0.013 0.381 0.002 12.4 41 0.48 
Spain 31 0.032 -0.071 -0.008 16.6 634 0.37 
Sweden 39 0.017 0.305 0.034 33.8 625 0.34 
Switzerland 48 0.033 1.021 0.058 22.9 341 0.27 
U.K. 319 0.039 0.332 0.043 20.1 601 0.93 
This table presents the number of observations (N), the mean impression management score accompanying 
non-GAAP disclosures (NGIM), the mean non-GAAP adjustments disclosed by managers  (unscaled and 
scaled by share price at the end of the previous year), and means of the country-level variables, all by 
country. NG_adjustment is the difference between non-GAAP disclosed by managers and GAAP earnings. 
 
TABLE 3 - Descriptive statistics, for all observations  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for main variables 
  Mean 1Q Median 3Q St.dev. 
CAR 0.068 0.016 0.071 0.127 0.087 
GAAP_surprise -0.017 -0.012 -0.001 0.004 0.514 
NG_adjustment 0.035 0.001 0.005 0.037 0.119 
NGIM score 0.031 0.000 0.026 0.054 0.051 
Size 9.174 8.339 9.143 9.983 1.194 
Book-to-Market Assets 0.349 0.211 0.321 0.465 0.213 
Capital expenditures 0.590 0.255 0.556 0.897 0.378 
Average sales growth 0.092 0.008 0.064 0.149 0.166 
Loss 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.283 
ROA volatility 0.032 0.009 0.019 0.034 0.054 
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Panel B: Pearson correlations 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) CAR 1 
(2) GAAP_surprise 0.086* 1 
(3) NG_adjustment 0.025 0.033 1 
(4) NGIM Score 0.217* 0.012 0.098* 1 
(5) Size -0.082* -0.002 -0.089* 0.018 1 
(6) Book-to-market assets -0.131* 0.011 0.087* -0.123* 0.237* 1 
(7) Capital expenditures 0.042 0.019 -0.038 -0.106* 0.107* 0.129* 1 
   (8) Average sales growth 0.114* -0.003 0.044 0.102* -0.069 0.010 -0.053 1 
(9) Loss -0.147* -0.073* 0.055 -0.145* 0.082* 0.174* -0.008 -0.005 1 
 (10)ROA Volatility -0.074* -0.023 0.056 -0.101* -0.215* -0.064 -0.012 0.069 0.248* 1 
This table presents summary statistics (Panel A) and correlation coefficients (Panel B) of the main variables. 
The definition of variables is as follows. CAR is the three-day abnormal market return adjusted for country-
specific market premium, size, and book-to-market. GAAP_surprise is the difference between GAAP 
earnings per share and the median consensus GAAP EPS forecast, scaled by share price at the end of the 
previous year. NG_adjustment is the difference between non-GAAP disclosed by managers and GAAP 
earnings, scaled by share price at the end of the previous year. NGIM is a score representing impression 
management around the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings measures (see Appendix). Size is the logarithm of 
total assets. Book-to-market assets is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity plus book 
value of total debt. Capital expenditures is the ratio of PPE to total assets. Average sales growth is growth in 
sales over the last 3 years. Loss is an indicator variable coded as one if GAAP earnings is negative, and zero 
otherwise. ROA Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of ROA (return on assets) over the previous 
three years. The number of observations is 845. The *symbol next to the Pearson correlation coefficient 
indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
 TABLE 4 – Impression management and aggressive non-GAAP disclosure 
 
Panel A: Exclusion of recurring items 
  NGIM score 
 Mean Median 
No recurring adjustments 0.025 0.016 
Recurring adjustments 0.035 0.024 
Test of difference [p-value]  0.062 0.059 
 
Panel B: Non-GAAP earnings with higher emphasis 
  NGIM score 
 Mean Median 
NG earnings have lower or same emphasis than GAAP earnings 0.029 0.024 
NG earnings have higher emphasis than GAAP earnings 0.045 0.038 
Test of difference [p-value]  0.001 <0.001 
 
Panel C: Beating analyst forecasts with non-GAAP 
  NGIM score 
 Mean Median 
Otherwise 0.033 0.029 
NG earnings meets/beats forecast but GAAP earnings does not 0.041 0.037 
Test of difference [p-value]  0.071 0.024 
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TABLE 5 - Persistence of non-GAAP adjustments and impression management 
 
  
Future  
Earnings 
Future operating 
income 
NG_EPS 1.552*** 2.706*** 
(5.55) (5.14) 
NG_adjustment  -0.476*** -0.703*** 
(-3.68) (-2.88) 
High_NGIM -0.331 -1.455 
(-0.28) (-0.66) 
High_NGIM*NG_EPS 0.170 0.213 
(1.23) (0.81) 
High_NGIM*NG_adjustment -0.581*** -0.803*** 
(-4.50) (-3.29) 
Size 0.130 0.553 
 
(0.32) (0.71) 
   Growth -0.466 -0.969 
(-0.69) (-0.74) 
Loss -3.223** -5.930** 
(-2.33) (-2.36) 
ROA volatility 0.198 0.469 
(0.57) (0.70) 
Constant 5.218** 11.276*** 
 
(2.15) (2.62) 
Time controls Yes Yes 
Industry controls Yes Yes 
Country controls Yes Yes 
N 845 845 
Adjusted R2 0.853 0.903 
This table presents regression results of the persistence of earnings and managers non-GAAP 
adjustments moderated by impression management. The definition of variables is as follows. 
NG_EPS is non-GAAP earnings per share. NG_Adjustment  is the difference between non-GAAP 
earnings disclosed by managers and GAAP earnings. High_NGIM is an indicator variable coded 
as one if the impression management score around non-GAAP disclosures is above the sample 
median, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Growth is a common factor of 
three variables: book-to-market assets, average sales growth in last three years, and capital 
expenditures to total assets. Loss is an indicator variable coded as one if GAAP earnings is 
negative, and zero otherwise. ROA volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of ROA 
(return on assets) over the previous three years. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significant 
coefficients at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). Parameter estimates are 
reported first, followed by robust t-statistics corrected for firm-level clustering in parentheses. 
TABLE 6 - Market reaction to non-GAAP adjustments and impression management 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GAAP_surprise 0.134*** 0.118** 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.119*** 
(3.00) (2.42) (3.14) (5.37) (7.35) 
NG_adjustment  0.061** 0.125** 0.110** 
(2.44) (2.97) (2.60) 
High_NGIM 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.037*** 
(5.35) (4.79) (3.82) 
High_NGIM x NG_adjustment -0.130*** -0.124*** 
(-5.78) (-4.49) 
High_OTHIM 0.027*** 
(4.90) 
High_OTHIM x GAAP_surprise 0.206 
(1.22) 
Constant 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.020 0.024*** 0.016** 
(4.50) (2.81) (1.45) (4.56) (3.32) 
N 845 845 845 845 845 
Adjusted R2 4.7% 5.8% 8.7% 8.9% 11.3% 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents regression results of the market reaction to non-GAAP disclosures moderated by 
impression management. The definition of variables is as follows. CAR is the three-day cumulative abnormal 
market return adjusted for country-specific market premium, size, and book to market. GAAP_surprise is the 
difference between GAAP earnings per share and the median consensus GAAP EPS forecast, scaled by share 
price at the end of the previous year. NG_adjustment is the difference between non-GAAP earnings disclosed 
by managers and GAAP earnings, scaled by share price at the end of the previous year. High_NGIM is an 
indicator variable coded as one if the impression management score around non-GAAP disclosures is above 
the sample median and zero otherwise. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significant coefficients at the 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). Parameter estimates are reported first, followed by 
robust t-statistics corrected for firm-level clustering in parentheses. 
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TABLE 7 - Market reaction to non-GAAP adjustments and impression management in different 
institutional environments 
 
Institutional 
Investors 
Number of 
analysts 
Investor 
protection 
Principal 
components  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GAAP_surprise 0.138*** 0.115*** 0.120*** 0.111*** 
(3.48) (6.77) (5.76) (7.21) 
NG_adjustment  0.130** 0.133*** 0.131** 0.128** 
(2.59) (2.67) (2.56) (2.50) 
High_NGIM 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 
(5.17) (5.30) (5.31) (5.30) 
High_NGIM x NG_adjustment -0.117* -0.154*** -0.112* -0.152** 
(-1.88) (-2.62) (-1.89) (-2.45) 
High_Country -0.006 -0.000 0.013* 
(-0.98) (-0.04) (1.72) 
High_NGIM x NG_adjustment x High_Country -0.111** -0.113*** -0.085*** 
(-2.03) (-4.92) (-3.42) 
High_SOPH 0.005 
(1.12) 
High_PROT 0.009*** 
(4.15) 
High_NGIM x NG_adjustment x High_SOPH -0.084*** 
(-3.16) 
High_NGIM x NG_adjustment x High_PROT -0.028* 
(-1.72) 
Constant 0.033** 0.031** 0.022 0.020 
(2.48) (2.11) (1.56) (1.45) 
N 845 845 845 845 
Adjusted R2 5.5% 6.2% 6.0% 8.3% 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the regression results of the market reaction to non-GAAP disclosures moderated by impression management 
and country-level variables. The definition of variables is as follows. CAR is the three-day cumulative abnormal market return 
adjusted for country-specific market premium, size, and book to market. GAAP_surprise is the difference between GAAP 
earnings per share and the median consensus GAAP EPS forecast, scaled by share price at the end of the previous year. 
NG_adjustment is the difference between non-GAAP earnings disclosed by managers and GAAP earnings, scaled by share price 
at the end of the previous year. High_NGIM  is an indicator variable coded as one if the impression management score around 
non-GAAP disclosures is above the sample median and zero otherwise. High_country is an indicator variable coded one if the 
country’s percentage of institutional ownership, number of analysts, or investor protection is above the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. In column (4) the three country measures are aggregated in two principal components that represent investor 
sophistication (SOPH) and investor protection (PROT). The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significant coefficients at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). Parameter estimates are reported first, followed by robust t-statistics corrected for 
firm-level clustering in parentheses. 
TABLE 8 - Selection model 
Panel A: Market reaction to non-GAAP adjustments and impression management in in 
different institutional environments 
  
Institutional 
Investors 
Number of 
analysts 
Investor 
protection 
  (1) (2) (3) 
GAAP_surprise 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 
(6.00) (6.01) (6.05) 
NG_adjustment  0.171*** 0.171*** 0.168*** 
(4.31) (4.74) (4.87) 
High_NGIM 0.028** 0.029** 0.030** 
(2.21) (2.13) (2.25) 
High_NGIM x NG_adjustment -0.070*** -0.066** -0.046* 
(-2.82) (-2.27) (-1.75) 
High_Country -0.006 0.012*** 0.015*** 
(-1.45) (3.98) (3.23) 
High_NGIM x NG_adjustment x High_Country -0.079*** -0.115*** -0.151*** 
(-2.74) (-3.62) (-3.43) 
Constant -0.009 -0.015 -0.020** 
(-0.80) (-1.42) (-2.28) 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes 
Test of independence of equations (Chi2) 16.75*** 16.84*** 17.49*** 
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Panel B: Determinants of non-GAAP disclosure (selection equation) 
Institutional 
Investors 
Number of 
analysts 
Investor 
protection 
(1) (2) (3) 
Analyst expectations 0.228*** 0.226*** 0.227*** 
(5.61) (5.51) (5.58) 
Growth in profit 0.080 0.080 0.081 
(1.32) (1.30) (1.31) 
Intangibility 0.843*** 0.839*** 0.844*** 
(2.72) (2.80) (2.80) 
ROA volatility 0.093 -0.101 -0.103 
 
(0.12) (-0.12) (-0.12) 
Special items 0.129 0.133 0.131 
(1.32) (1.39) (1.35) 
Size 0.027 0.029 0.027 
(0.60) (0.65) (0.62) 
Leverage -0.068 -0.086 -0.088 
(-0.29) (-0.39) (-0.39) 
Constant -0.127 -0.134 -0.122 
  (-0.41) (-0.43) (-0.39) 
This table presents the estimation results of a selection model that analyzes the market 
reaction to non-GAAP disclosures moderated by impression management and country-level 
factors. Panel A reports the results for the second-stage equation of market reaction, and 
Panel B reports the results for the first-stage selection equation. CAR is the three-day 
cumulative abnormal market return adjusted for country-specific market premium, size, and 
book to market. GAAP_surprise is the difference between GAAP earnings per share and the 
median consensus GAAP EPS forecast, scaled by share price at the end of the previous year. 
NG_adjustment is the difference between non-GAAP earnings disclosed by managers and 
GAAP earnings, scaled by share price at the end of the previous year. High_NGIM is an 
indicator variable coded as one if the impression management score around non-GAAP 
disclosures is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. High_country is an indicator 
variable coded one if the country’s percentage of institutional ownership, number of 
analysts, or investor protection is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Panel B 
reports the estimation results of the selection equation. The variables are as follows: Analyst 
Expectations is an indicator variable coded as one if non-GAAP earnings meet or beat the 
analyst consensus forecast, and zero otherwise. Profit growth is an indicator variable coded 
as one if non-GAAP earnings exceed previous year’s GAAP earnings, and zero otherwise. 
Intangibility is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Special items is an indicator 
variable coded as one when the firm reports special or extraordinary items, and zero 
otherwise. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significant coefficients at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). Parameter estimates are reported first, followed by 
robust t-statistics corrected for firm-level clustering in parentheses.  
 
